Nicholas Carollo
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Nicholas A. Carollo

I am a senior economist in the Labor Markets section of the Division of Research and Statistics at the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. My research focuses on labor and applied microeconomics, in particular the impact of occupational licensing requirements on the labor market and long-run trends in the U.S. occupation structure. Prior to joining the Fed, I received my PhD from the University of California Los Angeles. This is my personal website. Any views and work presented here are my own and do not represent the views or policies of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or its staff.

Contact: carollo.nicholas (at) gmail.com

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Working papers

The Origins and Evolution of Occupational Licensing in the United States (with Jason Hicks, Andrew Karch, and Morris Kleiner)

The analysis of occupational licensing has largely concentrated on its influence in the labor market and on consumer welfare. By contrast, relatively little is known about how occupational licensing laws originated or the key factors in their evolution. In this paper, we study the determinants of state-level licensing requirements from 1870 to 2020. We begin by developing a model where licensing arises as an endogenous political outcome and use this framework to study how market characteristics and political incentives impact the likelihood of regulation. Our empirical analysis draws on a novel database tracking the initial enactment of licensing legislation for hundreds of unique occupations, as well as changes to the specific qualifications required to attain a license over time. Consistent with the predictions of our model, we find first that licensing is more prevalent and was adopted earlier for occupations that plausibly pose a greater risk of harm to consumers. Second, within occupations, regulation tends to diffuse from larger to smaller markets over time. Finally, the political organization of an occupation, as measured by the establishment of a state professional association, significantly increases the probability of a licensing statute being enacted.

Historical Data on Occupational Regulation in the United States

Download paper (updated January 2025); Data repository (partial sample)

This paper describes the construction and validation of a novel dataset that compiles over one hundred and fifty years of occupational licensing, certification, and registration requirements in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. It identifies the enactment and effective dates of state and federal policy changes for more than 300 distinct occupations that cover the vast majority of regulated jobs in the United States. Relative to existing data on occupational licensing and regulation, my dataset is more comprehensive, reduces measurement error in enactment dates, and offers an internally-consistent taxonomy of regulatory methods. Linking my policy data to independent measures of occupational licensing and certification from recent household survey data and the text of online job postings, I show that state-level policy differences have an economically significant effect on the credentials workers hold and employers require. I discuss the interpretation of estimates based on these measures and conclude with recommendations and directions for future research.

The Impact of Occupational Licensing on Earnings and Employment: Evidence from State-Level Policy Changes

Download paper (updated November 2020)

This paper studies the short- and long-run impact of occupational licensing on labor market outcomes in the United States. I compile new data from contemporary and historical legislative documentation that records all state-level policy changes for over 200 licensed occupations. Using this data, I implement an event study design that exploits within-occupation variation in the timing of licensing statutes across states to trace out the dynamic response of earnings and employment to policy changes. I find consistent evidence across several independent employer and household surveys that the typical licensing statute adopted during the past half-century increased worker earnings, but had null or weakly positive effects on employment. Twenty-five years after licensing statutes were adopted, cumulative wage growth in treated state-occupation cells exceeded that of untreated controls by 4 to 7%. Over the same time period, my results rule out an average disemployment effect greater than -5%. The data show much larger decreases in employment, however, among occupations that have little potential to cause serious harm. In cases where the consumer protection rationale for licensing is more plausible, I find simultaneous increases in both earnings and employment following the adoption of licensing requirements.

Other work in progress

New Work in the Second Industrial Revolution (with Jingyi Huang and Elior Cohen)

This paper introduces a new measure of emerging occupations in the late 19th and early 20th century United States. Rapid technological and procedural innovation dramatically altered the task content of production, leading to the emergence and diffusion of entirely new work activities and occupations. We use the original write-in occupation responses recorded on Census enumeration forms between 1850 and 1940 to identify specific, granular, job titles such as “comptometer operator” at the individual level and track their growth over time. Using this data, we first document a set of novel facts about new jobs during the Second Industrial Revolution including the locations where they first appeared, how quickly they diffused across local labor markets and industries, and the demographic characteristics of the workers who held them. Next, we match job titles observed in the Census to textual descriptions of their tasks and tools derived from the first edition of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. We link these job descriptions to a comprehensive corpus of U.S. patent texts to study the relationship between the adoption of new production methods, the skill content of new work, and local labor market power.